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ABSTRACT
Automated vehicles will not only redefine the role of drivers,
but also present new challenges in assessing product liability. In
light of the increased risks of software defects in automated
vehicles, this Note will review the current legal and regulatory
framework related to product liability and assess the challenges
in addressing on-board software defects and cybersecurity
breaches from both the consumer and manufacturer perspective.
While manufacturers are expected to assume more responsibility
for accidents as vehicles become fully automated, it can be
difficult to determine the scope of liability regarding unexpected
software defects. On the other hand, consumers face new
challenges in bringing product liability claims against
manufacturers and developers.

INTRODUCTION
The automated car1 is no longer a fiction. Tech companies, such
as Google and Apple, as well as many traditional automakers, have begun
investing in automated vehicle technologies. 2 Most recently, Dyson, a
company most famous for its vacuum cleaners, announced plans to
develop an electric vehicle equipped with basic self-driving features by
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1
While there are varying terms referring to automated vehicles, such as selfdriving vehicles, driverless vehicles, and autonomous vehicles, I will use the
term “automated vehicles” as recognized by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA). See Automated Vehicles for Safety, NAT’L
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ASS’N, https://www.nhtsa.gov/technologyinnovation/automated-vehicles-safety (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).
2
Danielle Muoio, 19 Companies Racing to Put Self-Driving Cars on the Road
By 2021, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 17, 2016, 1:12 PM), http://www.businessinsider.
com/companies-making-driverless-cars-by-2020-2016-10/#honda-is-aiming-toproduce-cars-that-are-completely-driverless-on-highways-by-2020-13.
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2020.3 In addition to transforming one’s driving experience, automated
vehicles also have great potential to improve road safety and reduce the
risk of injury and death to passengers.4 Some of the benefits of automated
vehicles listed in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s
(NHTSA) latest guidance for automated driving systems include a
decrease in accidents, reduced traffic congestion, and increased mobility
options for those with disabilities.5
This Note will review the increasing importance, and potential
risks, of software safety in automated vehicles, as well as the challenges
in applying the existing product liability theories to accidents caused
solely by software defects in fully automated vehicles. While this new
market is still in its infancy, the fast pace of technological advances
requires policymakers to closely monitor development and ensure that this
new technology is safely introduced into the public sphere. The accident
involving Tesla’s Model S in May 2016, which resulted in the death of the
driver, suggests that courts may soon be faced with cases analyzing the
liability of accidents caused by fully automated vehicles.6 As cars become
increasingly dependent on software and electronics, they will also become
more susceptible to accidents caused by software defects. Unfortunately,
it is unclear whether current product liability theories will effectively
resolve disputes regarding defects of the rapidly developing automated
vehicle technology. Therefore, an adequate framework for assessing
vehicle products liability regarding these new technologies should be in
place to incentivize manufacturers to enhance the safety of these vehicles,

3

James Titcomb, Dyson Plans to Launch Electric Car in 2020, TELEGRAPH
(Sept. 26, 2017, 4:45 PM) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/
2017/09/26/dyson-build-first-electric-car-uk-2020/.
4
JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE
FOR POLICY MAKERS 135 (2016).
5
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ASS’N, supra note 1.
6
Preliminary Report, Highway HWY16FH018, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD,
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/HWY16FH018preliminary.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2017) (noting that the driver of the Tesla
Model S was using Tesla’s driver assistance feature when the car collided at 74
mph with a semitrailer); see also Sam Levin, Uber crash shows ‘catastrophic
failure’ of self-driving technology, experts say, GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2018, 3:32
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/22/self-driving-caruber-death-woman-failure-fatal-crash-arizona (self-driving Uber SUV struck a
pedestrian crossing a street at night); see also Sean O'Kane,
Tesla defends Autopilot after fatal Model X crash, THE VERGE (Mar. 28, 2018,
11:46 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/28/17172178/tesla-model-xcrash-autopilot-fire-investigation (Tesla Model X crashed into the safety barrier
and the driver died from injuries sustained in the crash).
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provide drivers appropriate expectations when it comes to safety and
liability, and promote the use of these vehicles.

I. BRIEF HISTORY OF AUTOMATED VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY
The idea of an autonomous vehicle was introduced to the public
as early as 1939 at the World’s Fair in New York, where the theme of the
international exposition was the “World of Tomorrow” and an automaker
envisioned highway traffic able to move at “unreduced rates of speed,”
achieved by maintaining a safe distance between cars through “automatic
radio control.” 7 Later, General Motors and the Radio Corporation of
America developed automated highway technology and demoed the 1958
Chevrolet Impala, equipped with technology that adjusted the steering
wheel independent of any cues (steering) by the driver.8 In the 1980s, a
German aerospace engineer, Ernst Dickmanns, tested a vehicle with
cameras and microprocessors that drove 20 kilometers at 90 kilometers per
hour. 9 In 1995, roboticists at Carnegie Mellon University tested the
NavLab 5, which drove almost 70 miles without human intervention.10
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
contributed to the significant development of automated vehicle
technology by holding the first long distance competition for automated
vehicles in 2004.11 Although none of the cars managed to finish the course
in 2004, five vehicles successfully completed a 132-mile course in the
following year’s Grand Challenge. 12 Sebastian Thrun, who led the
development of Stanley, an automated vehicle which won the 2005 Grand
Challenge, later started Google’s self-driving car project in 2009.13 As of
May 2017, Google’s automated vehicle had driven without a pilot for three

7

See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 1; Jeff Quitney, Futurama 1939 New
York World's Fair “To New Horizons” 1940 General Motors 23min, YOUTUBE
(Aug. 7, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1cRoaPLvQx0. See also
Alan Taylor, The 1939 New York World's Fair, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 1, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2013/11/the-1939-new-york-worldsfair/100620/.
8
Tom Vanderbilt, Autonomous Cars Through the Ages, WIRED (Feb. 6, 2012,
6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2012/02/autonomous-vehicle-history/.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Denise Chow, DARPA and Drone Cars: How the US Military Spawned SelfDriving Car Revolution, LIVE SCIENCE (Mar. 21, 2014, 2:27 PM)
https://www.livescience.com/44272-darpa-self-driving-car-revolution.html.
12
Id.
13
Danielle Muoio, Here's Everything We Know About Google's Driverless Cars,
BUS. INSIDER (July 25, 2016, 2:50 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/googledriverless-car-facts-2016-7/.
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million miles. 14 Google has tested the vehicles in five U.S. states. 15 In
2016, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration acknowledged in
one of its statements regarding automated vehicles that “partially and fully
automated vehicles are nearing the point at which widespread deployment
is feasible.”16

II. INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF SOFTWARE SAFETY IN VEHICLES
Software is becoming increasingly important in conventional
vehicles. John Paul McDuffle, the Director of the Program on Vehicle and
Mobility Innovation (PVMI) at the University of Pennsylvania, stated,
“the average Ford auto by 2010 already had more lines of code than a
Boeing Dreamliner aircraft.”17 According to a 2017 independent advisory
firm report, vehicle defects related to integrated electronic components
and software are the likely cause of the increased number of recalls in
recent years.18 For example, the report noted that General Motors recalled
3.6 million vehicles in 2016 because the computers in the recalled vehicles
could cause the airbags and seatbelts to malfunction.19
Inevitably, automated vehicles will involve more integration of
complex technologies that might be vulnerable to internal software defects
or a third party breach. Particularly, increased connectivity of modern
vehicles poses a greater threat to software hacking than ever before. This
concern was evidenced in a class action lawsuit filed against Toyota, Ford,
and General Motors in 2015, alleging that the computer technology in their
vehicles was susceptible to hacking.20 Also, in an experiment conducted
by two security engineers on an unaltered 2014 Jeep Cherokee, engineers
found that they could remotely control the Jeep driving at low speeds,

14

On the Road, WAYMO, https://waymo.com/ontheroad/ (last visited Dec. 1,
2017).
15
Id.
16
“DOT/NHTSA POLICY STATEMENT CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES”
2016 UPDATE TO “PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING
AUTOMATED VEHICLES,” AM. ASS’N MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINS. 1 (Jan 14,
2016).
17
Connected Vehicles: How Soon Will They Hit the Road?, WHARTON SCHOOL
(Aug. 1, 2017), https://pvmi.wharton.upenn.edu/news/driverless-connectedvehicles/.
18
Neil Steinkamp, 2016 Automotive Warranty & Recall Report, STOUT
ADVISORY (May 1, 2016), https://www.stoutadvisory.com/insights/report/2016automotive-warranty-recall-report.
19
Id.
20
Cahen v. Toyota Motor Corp., 147 F. Supp. 3d 955, 958 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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including its brakes and steering.21 Manufacturers can likely expect more
product liability claims involving software vulnerability in the future.

III. CURRENT PRODUCT LIABILITY TEST
In addition to a breach of warranty claim, under current tort
liability theories, a plaintiff could claim that the seller or the manufacturer
is liable for a vehicle defect under either strict product liability or
negligence theory.22 While there may be variations across jurisdictions,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines negligence as “conduct which
falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk of harm.” 23 In the case of a fully automated
vehicle, negligence theory may not be appealing for plaintiffs since
manufacturers will likely exercise reasonable care, or at least make it
difficult to prove otherwise, to avoid causing any unreasonable risk of
injury. Unless manufacturers recklessly fail to protect against standard
risks involved in driving a vehicle, plaintiffs would likely fail to prove that
the manufacturers’ conduct fell below the necessary standard.
On the other hand, manufacturers may still be liable under strict
product liability regardless of whether they exercised the duty of
reasonable care. 24 The three categories of defects under the product
liability theory are manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning
defects.

A. Manufacturing Defect
Manufacturing defects can be found when the product does not
meet the intended specification set by the manufacturer.25 The idea of a
manufacturing defect is based on the expectation that “a mass-produced
product will not differ from its siblings in a manner that makes it more

21

CHRIS VALASEK & CHARLIE MILLER, REMOTE EXPLOITATION OF AN
UNALTERED PASSENGER VEHICLE 87–88 (2015), available at
https://ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Car_Hacking.pdf.
22
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 402A, 281 (AM. LAW INST. 1979);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
23
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)
24
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 cmt. (a) (AM. LAW INST.
1998) (noting it “is no defense that [manufacturers] acted reasonably and did not
discover a defect in the product”).
25
Id. at § 2(a) (“A product (a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product
departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in
the preparation and marketing of the product.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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dangerous than the others.” 26 In the context of vehicle defects, the
consumer would have to show that the vehicle, or the vehicle part, did not
operate as the manufacturer warranted.
Plaintiffs might be able to use circumstantial evidence to prove
that a product malfunctioned.27 Under this approach, plaintiffs would only
have to show that “(1) the product malfunctioned, (2) the malfunction
occurred during proper use, and (3) the product had not been altered or
misused in a manner that probably caused the malfunction.” 28 For
example, a court found Toyota’s vehicle at fault by applying the principles
of res ipsa loquitor regarding an alleged sudden acceleration claim against
Toyota when there was no traceable record plaintiffs could find from the
defective vehicle.29 Courts might not always accept this theory, and they
may disallow “plaintiffs or juries to rely on guess, conjecture, or
speculation.”30 But, manufacturers should be wary of the uncertainty and
lack of clarity surrounding their potential liability.

B. Design Defect
A plaintiff can bring a design defect claim if the product is
designed in an unreasonably dangerous manner. Under the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the consumer expectations test is used. The Restatement
(Third) of Torts, however, rejects the consumer expectations test and
instead adopts the risk-utility test to prove design defects.31
1. Consumer Expectations Test
While the Restatement (Third) of Torts rejects the consumer
expectations test, some states may still use this test.32 The Restatement
26

Casey v. Toyota Motor Eng'g & Mfg. N. Am., Inc., 770 F. 3d 322, 329 (5th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Green v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 274 F. 3d 263, 268
(5th Cir. 2001)).
27
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(a) cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1998) (describing the method as “a function similar to the concept of res ipsa
loquitur, allowing deserving plaintiffs to succeed notwithstanding what would
otherwise be difficult or insuperable problems of proof”).
28
David G. Owen, Manufacturing Defects, 53 S.C. L. REV. 851, 873 (2002); see
also White v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 99 A.3d 1079, 1090 (Conn. 2014).
29
In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices,
and Prods. Liab. Litig., 978 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1096–97 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
30
Owen, supra note 28, at 878.
31
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST.
1998) (noting that “consumer expectations do not constitute an independent
standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs.”).
32
See Crump v. Versa Prods., Inc., 400 F.3d 1104, 1108 (8th Cir. 2005) (“A
product is ‘actionable if dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer, who either purchases it or uses it, with
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(Second) of Torts defines a design defect as a “condition not contemplated
by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to
him.”33 To be “unreasonably dangerous,” the product “must be dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics.”34
In McCabe v. Am. Honda Motor Co., the court further discussed
the applicability of this test in a product liability action regarding a failed
airbag.35 Accepting the application of the consumer expectations test, the
court noted that an ordinary consumer’s expectations should not be
assessed based on his knowledge of the product in isolation, but instead
“in the context of the facts and circumstances of its failure” to see if he
“can form minimum safety expectations.”36 However, not all courts will
adopt the consumer expectations test for product liability claims,
especially for technically complex issues. For example, in a plaintiff’s
design defect claim regarding her vehicle’s airbag deployment that caused
her injury, the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted that “consumer
expectations cannot be the basis of liability in a case involving complex
technical matters.”37
Since automated vehicle technologies are still in their infancy,
consumer expectations for “reasonable safety” are likely to change
dramatically over time. Although the public might be hesitant to believe
in the safety of current automated vehicle technology, consumers will
likely expect fully automated vehicles to operate in a reasonably safe
manner once they become more readily available.38 The NHTSA ranks
vehicles based on their level of automated technology. 39 If the highest
NHTSA level of automated vehicle technology is in fact achieved and

the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics’”);
Griffin v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 124 P.3d 57, 63 (Kan. 2005) (noting that “the
final test is one of consumer expectations” for a design defect claim).
33
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
34
Id. at cmt. i.
35
McCabe v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 313 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
36
Id.
37
Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 62, 77 (1st Cir. 2002).
38
See Jack Barkenbus, To Get the Most Out of Self-Driving Cars, Tap the
Brakes on Their Rollout, CONVERSATION (Jan. 3, 2018, 6:25 AM),
https://theconversation.com/to-get-the-most-out-of-self-driving-cars-tap-thebrakes-on-their-rollout-88444.
39
See Automated Vehicles for Safety, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ASS’N,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/automated-vehicles-safety (last
visited Apr. 19, 2018).
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becomes available, ordinary consumers, as well as courts, might find it
reasonable to expect a very high level of safety from automated vehicles.40
2. Risk-Utility Test
While rejecting the consumer expectations test, the Restatement
(Third) of Torts endorses the risk-utility test for design defects.41 The riskutility test finds a product to be defective when that product’s foreseeable
risk of harm “could have been reduced or avoided” by adopting “a
reasonable alternative design . . .” and not doing so “renders the product
not reasonably safe . . . .”42 The Restatement (Third) further explains the
balance between risks and benefits by adding that “excessively safe”
products would not be any more beneficial than “products that are too
risky.”43
Courts might evaluate a number of factors to assess whether the
level of danger outweighs the utility of a product. For example, the New
York Court of Appeals has identified seven factors to consider in a riskutility test:44
(1) the utility of the product to the public as a whole and to the
individual user; (2) the likelihood that it will cause injury (also known
as the nature of the product); (3) the availability of a safer design; (4)
the potential for designing and manufacturing the product so that it is
safer but remains functional and reasonably priced; (5) the ability of
the plaintiff to avoid injury by careful use of the product; (6) the
degree of awareness of the potential danger of the product which can
reasonably be attributed to the plaintiff; and (7) the manufacturer's
ability to spread any cost related to improving the safety of the
design.45

The key to prevailing on a risk-utility test is to show a reasonable
alternative design that would have reduced the risk of harm as noted in

40

See id. (noting the highest level of automation is when “the vehicle is capable
of performing all functions under all conditions” and “the driver may have the
option to control the vehicle.”).
41
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g. (AM. LAW INST.
1998). Compare Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 701 S.E.2d 5, 16–17 (S.C. 2010)
(remanding case for retrial using “risk-utility test and not the consumer
expectations test”), with Aubin v. Union Carbide Corp., 177 So. 3d 489, 520
(Fla. 2015) (adhering to the Restatement (Second) of Torts and adopting the
consumer expectation test in a design defect case).
42
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
43
Id. at § 2 cmt. a.
44
See Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208–09 (N.Y. 1983)
45
Id.
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element (3) and (4) above from the New York Court of Appeals.46 For
example, under Texas law, to prevail on a design defect claim, “a plaintiff
must prove that (1) the product was defectively designed so as to render it
unreasonably dangerous; (2) a safer alternative design existed; and (3) the
defect was a producing cause of the injury for which the plaintiff seeks
recovery.”47 In some jurisdictions, the burden of providing the risk benefit
analysis shifts to the defendant if the plaintiff proves that product design
is the proximate cause of the damage.48 For example, in McCabe, the court
held that once the injured plaintiff showed that the alleged design defect
caused his injury, “the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the benefits
of the design outweigh its inherent risks.”49
In the context of software defects for vehicles, plaintiffs might be
able to use subsequent updates in the software as evidence of a reasonable
alternative design. However, this would not be permitted in federal courts
unless such updates were made prior to the accident due to Federal Rules
of Evidence 407. 50 In contrast, state courts might allow subsequent
measures by manufacturers as evidence for strict product liability claims.
For example, the Supreme Court of California held that California
Evidence Code § 1151, which bars the admission of subsequent remedial
measures as evidence, applies to prove negligence or culpability but not
strict liability. 51 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that
evidence of subsequent remedial measures regarding the suspension
system of the vehicle at issue is admissible.52

C. Warning Defect
Plaintiffs can also bring a product liability claim for a warning
defect if “foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings
. . . . ”53 In other words, manufacturers have a duty to provide adequate
warning of danger and to provide reasonable instructions to use the
46

Daniel A. Crane et al., A Survey of Legal Issues Arising from the Deployment
of Autonomous and Connected Vehicles, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV.
191, 260 (2017).
47
Goodner v. Hyundai Motor Co., Ltd., 650 F.3d 1034, 1040 (5th Cir. 2011).
48
See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978); CollazoSantiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 149 F.3d 23, 25–26 (1st Cir. 1998).
49
McCabe v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 315 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
50
FED. R. EVID. 407 (“When measures are taken that would have made an
earlier injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures
is not admissible to prove . . . a defect . . . or . . . a need for a warning . . . . ”).
51
Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Cal. 1974).
52
Chart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 258 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Wis. 1977).
53
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
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product safely. Even without a manufacturing or design defect, a court
might still find the manufacturer liable for failure to attach an adequate
warning to a product. 54 An adequate warning does not absolve the
manufacturer of a liability for other defect claims.55 However, risks that
are obvious to an ordinary consumer, or the public, do not fall under the
category of risks that manufacturers have a duty to warn their consumers
about.56
Furthermore, depending on the subject matter regarding the
alleged warning defect, expert testimony might be required. For example,
the court in Ruggiero v. Yamaha Motor Corp., finding no need for expert
testimony regarding a product defect claim for a personal watercraft, still
noted that “expert testimony is required in a warning defect case where the
subject matter ‘falls outside of the common knowledge of the factfinder
and depends on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.’”57
For software defects of automated vehicles, courts are likely to find that
the technical issues fall outside of consumers’ common knowledge.

IV. APPLICATION/LIMITATIONS
A. How Much Control Is Attributable to the Manufacturer or the
Software Designer?
One of the most important considerations in the shift of focus on
product liability assessment from regular vehicles to automated vehicles
is: with the shift of control over the vehicle, which parties will assume new
liability? As vehicles become more fully automated, accidents are less
likely to be caused by driver error but more likely to be caused by product
defects, and manufacturers may assume increased liability for accidents
related to these mechanical errors. 58 The challenge lies in determining to
54

See Battersby v. Boyer, 526 S.E.2d 159, 162 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (“[A] duty
to warn can arise even if a product is not defective.”).
55
See Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Mass. 1978)
(“Whether or not adequate warnings are given is a factor to be considered on the
issue of negligence, but warnings cannot absolve the manufacturer or designer
of all responsibility for the safety of the product.”).
56
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST.
1998) (explaining that typically “no duty is owed to warn of obvious and
generally known dangers”).
57
Ruggiero v. Yamaha Motor Corp., No. 15-49 (JBS/KMW), 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48908, at *24–25 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2017) (quoting Jerista v. Murray, 883
A.2d 350, 364 (N.J. 2005)).
58
See GILLIAN YEOMANS, LLOYD’S EXPOSURE MANAGEMENT, AUTONOMOUS
VEHICLES HANDING OVER CONTROL: OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS FOR
INSURANCE 18–19 (2014) (discussing the potential for increased liability to
manufacturers of automated vehicles).
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what extent the automated vehicle’s software or algorithm defect is
attributable to the manufacturer.
One may argue that software is only as good as its designers and
programmers, and those who design the software should be liable for any
on-board software defect, including defects that may result from the
designer’s failure to predict a particular problem. The accident of a 2005
Toyota Camry that accelerated suddenly, injured the driver, and took the
life of the passenger illustrates the difficulty of detecting a software defect
before it is too late. 59 The plaintiffs argued that the electronic throttle
system of the vehicle had a design defect and caused the sudden
acceleration. 60 One of the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony during the trial
illustrates the three problems that engineers face with preventing software
defects.
[J]ust because a company and its engineers think up 100 possible
things that can go wrong, or a thousand possible things that can go
wrong and implement a set of failsafes that they think will defend
against them, there is two problems with that. The first is the failure
of imagination possibility, which is it didn't get on their list. They
forgot that it was possible that tasks could die, for example. Another
possibility is that failsafe itself has a bug in it, a hole in it, a gap . . .
So a third thing that can go wrong is that one of those gaps is exposed
in the safety architecture. And sometimes it takes all three of those
happening at once in order for your car to malfunction or to
malfunction in a dangerous way that you report. For example, it
might begin with a hardware . . . and that might cause a bug and that
might escape detection because they didn't think of that possibility.61

Because a fully automated vehicle is expected to make decisions
on its own based on its algorithm, manufacturers might argue that it would
be impossible to enable such autonomous decision-making capability
while still being liable for the vehicle’s decisions.62 Regardless of how the
liability gets allocated between software designers and vehicle
59

See Brief for Petitioner at ¶ 11, Bookout v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. CJ-20087969, 2013 WL 5596096 (Okl. Dist. Sept. 13, 2013), (No. CJ-2008-7969), 2009
WL 9155882 (Okl. Dist. Sept. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Toyota].
60
See id.; Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration Lawsuit Ends in Landmark
Verdict, BEASLEY ALLEN LAW FIRM (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.beasleyallen.
com/news/toyota-sudden-unintended-acceleration-lawsuit-ends-in-landmarkverdict/.
61
Transcript of Record at 60–61, Bookout v. Toyota Motor Corp., No CJ-20087969 (Okl. Dist. Oct. 14, 2013) [hereinafter Transcript].
62
See John W. Zipp, The Road Will Never Be the Same: A Reexamination of
Tort Liability for Autonomous Vehicles, 43 TRANSP. L.J. 137, 163 (2016) (“It
will be virtually impossible for an autonomous vehicle manufacturer to conceive
of every possible situation that may arise while driving.”).
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manufacturers, both will argue that most if not all software defects should
be treated as unforeseeable risks of harm. Also, it would be difficult for
plaintiffs to argue that manufacturers should be fully liable for software
defects caused by unusual external causes, such as hacking.

B. Is Software a Manufactured Product?
Whether tort law regards software as a product, rather than a
service, will also play a role in determining the application of product
liability to software defects. A “product” is defined under the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability as a “tangible personal property
distributed commercially for use or consumption.” 63 However, the
Restatement does not consider services to be products. 64 Unlike other
component parts of a vehicle, because software is not a tangible
“manufactured product,” a court might find that manufacturing defect
theory is not applicable for software or algorithmic errors in automated
vehicles. 65 While many courts have applied contract law in software
related cases under the Uniform Commercial Code, software
manufacturers have not been found strictly liable for software defects
based on tort product liability theories.66
From the perspective of consumers, adopting strict liability would
encourage manufacturers to perform enough tests to find and prevent
63

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 19(a) (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
64
Id. at § 19(b); see id. at § 19 cmt. a (“Apart from statutes that define ‘product’
for purposes of determining products liability, in every instance it is for the court
to determine as a matter of law whether something is, or is not, a product.”).
65
Roy Alan Cohen, Self-Driving Technology and Autonomous Vehicles: A
Whole New World for Potential Product Liability Discussion, IADC PROD.
LIAB. COMMITTEE NEWSLETTER (Int’l Ass’n Def. Counsel), May 2015, at 332,
available at http://pbnlaw.com/media/540169/Cohen-IADC-Product-LiabilityMay-2015.pdf; see also Jeffrey K. Gurney, Article, Sue My Car Not Me:
Products Liability and Accidents Involving Autonomous Vehicles, 13 U. ILL. J.
L. TECH. & POL'Y 247, 259 (2013).
66
See Joseph L. Reutiman, Defective Information: Should Information be a
“Product” Subject to Products Liability Claims?, 22 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 181, 195 (2012) (“Those courts that have determined whether computer
software is a ‘good’ under the Uniform Commercial Code have struggled to
apply a tangible–intangible distinction and have reached conflicting conclusions.
Such courts have tended to focus on the service-like aspects of a software sale as
compared to the tangible aspects of the software medium.”); Robert D. Sprague,
Software Products Liability: Has Its Time Arrived?, 19 W. ST. U. L. REV. 137,
140 (1991). But see Frances E. Zollers et al., No More Soft Landings for
Software: Liability for Defects in an Industry That Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 745, 774 (2005) (contending that
“software should be considered a ‘product’ for product liability purposes.”).
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software defects before the software is released into the market instead of
rushing to the market “in the hope that users will find the bugs and report
them.”67 Some scholars note that software industry is “no longer in its
infancy” and that limiting the application of strict liability to software “that
foreseeably causes physical harm when defective” could minimize the
concern over other software designers whose software are less likely to
cause physical harm. 68 On the other hand, strict liability could
significantly stifle innovation, especially since it could hinder software
developers’ use of software written by other companies or software
components that were freely available. 69 Likewise, manufacturers and
software designers might argue that the automated vehicle industry is not
mature enough to absorb all unforeseeable risks since spreading the cost
among very few buyers will not be economically feasible.70 However, as
automated vehicle technology matures, the argument that strict liability
stifles innovation will likely lose its force.
How much direct control consumers have over vehicles’ software
might also determine the applicability of strict liability. 71 For example,
when assessing liability for defects related to “extrinsic software” that
consumers purchase and interact with directly consumers’ negligent
behavior such as not keeping antivirus software up-to-date should be
considered.72 However, software embedded in automated vehicles would
likely be treated as “intrinsic software” since drivers might not be fully
aware of the myriad list of software embedded in a vehicle, and prescribing
strict liability might be appropriate.73 Considering the increasing risk of
physical injury due to software defects, courts and federal agencies
overseeing vehicle safety standards will soon have to determine whether
or to what extent strict liability can be extended to software to ensure
adequate consumer protection without deterring technological progress.

67

Zollers et al., supra note 66, at 769.
Id. at 771.
69
Seldon J. Childers, Don’t Stop the Music: No Strict Products Liability for
Embedded Software, 19 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 153 (2008).
70
Id. at 173.
71
T. Randolph Beard et al., Tort Liability for Software Developers: A Law &
Economics Perspective, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 199, 200–01
(2009).
72
Id. at 230.
73
Id. at 230. But see Sean O'Kane & Lauren Goode, George Hotz is Giving
Away the Code Behind His Self-Driving Car Project, VERGE (Nov. 30, 2016,
2:12 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/11/30/13779336/comma-aiautopilot-canceled-autonomous-car-software-free (noting that open source
software for automated vehicles might become a reality, and lie outside existing
rules promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration).
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C. What Is the Impact on the Cost of Litigation?
Although records of vehicle operation and software error will be
more readily available thanks to advancements in technology, this might
not be good news for consumers, as they will not be able to prevail based
on circumstantial evidence. The plaintiff who sought a software defect
claim stemming from Camry’s sudden acceleration problem in 2013
would not have enjoyed the same decision by the court without admissible
evidence specifying the defect if Toyota had tracked its vehicle’s software
operation.74 For example, if the recorded data of an automated vehicle in
an accident indicates that driver was warned by the system to take manual
control, a court might find it difficult to hold the manufacturer fully liable
for the accident.
Also, courts have hesitated to accept circumstantial evidence
based on the malfunction doctrine if the vehicle has been used
extensively75 or if it had been repaired.76 Therefore, if automated vehicles
have been used for an extended period or shared among multiple drivers,
courts might be reluctant to attribute liability to the manufacturer or the
software designer simply based on circumstantial evidence. Furthermore,
due to the complex nature of automated vehicle technology, finding an
expert witness to testify will be difficult and expensive.77 Some plaintiffs
might be turned away from bringing a claim because the cost of litigation
would be too high and would not be covered by award.78
On the other hand, the cost of product liability litigation as well as
the impact of litigation will be also be a concern for manufacturers of
automated vehicles, which might lead them to mitigate product liability
claims. 79 By avoiding a product liability claim, manufacturers could
74

In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices &
Prods. Liab. Litig., 978 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2013). See also
Toyota, supra note 59.
75
See Corcoran v. Gen. Motors Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 55, 69 (D.D.C. 2000)
(rejecting an inference of product defect for a vehicle used for over seven years).
76
See Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 85 S.W.3d 323, 326 (Tex. App. 2002)
(holding that “the dealer's intervening repair and replacement of the allegedly
defective” ignition switch precludes application of the malfunction doctrine).
77
Gurney, supra note 65, at 265–66 (noting that multiple expert witnesses will
be needed to assess the highly complex algorithm of an automated vehicle).
78
Joseph Sanders, Adversarial Legalism & Civil Litigation: Prospects for
Change, 28 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 719, 723 (2003).
79
François J. Castaing, The Effects of Product Liability on Automotive
Engineering Practice, in PRODUCT LIABILITY AND INNOVATION: MANAGING
RISK IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT, 77, 79 (1994) (noting that “threat of
product liability” can impede manufacturers drive to implement “new or
improved designs” in vehicles).
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protect the reputation of their products, consumer loyalty, and corporate
goodwill, which will be especially crucial for the success of this new
technology. 80 Therefore, to control product liability exposure regarding
their automated vehicles, manufacturers might be advised by their
counsels to take preventive measures to avoid product liability exposure,
including: proper warning, specifying policies regarding insurance and
indemnification, and retaining experts.81 Additionally, courts often order
the prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees from defendants in
product liability claims based on the terms of the contract or statute.82
Consequently, plaintiff-oriented attorneys might be willing to represent
victims of automated vehicle related accidents on a contingency fee
arrangement. This would lower consumers’ financial barrier to bringing a
claim.83

D. What Should Consumers Expect?
As discussed in section B, the Restatement (Third) of Torts rejects
the consumer expectations test for design defect claims.84 Moreover, even
if a court were to accept the consumer expectations test, consumers might
not be able to argue that ordinary users’ expectations regarding automated
vehicles should be the basis of assessing liability since it involves a
complicated, developing technology. Also, software developers might not
be able to predict every possible software error deviation from a vehicle’s
expected operation.85 For example, an unexpected error not traceable or
attributable to the software designer is certainly plausible if the vehicle is
given the capacity to truly “think independently.”86
If it is unreasonable for manufacturers to expect automated
vehicles to be foolproof, courts might find that consumers should also not
expect automated vehicles to be entirely free of software defects. Also,
80

JEFFREY A. SOBLE, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, PREEMPTING AND MITIGATING
PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS 2.
81
Id. at 4–5.
82
Bylsma v. Willey, No. 20140484, 2017 WL 5998937, at *22 (Utah Dec. 1,
2017) (noting that a court may award attorney fees “through the reciprocal
attorney fee provision of the Utah Code”); Cashio v. Kojis & Sons Signs, 568
So. 2d 1388, 1389 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that attorney fee may be awarded
to the purchaser of the product in a product liability action).
83
Id.
84
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST.
1998) (noting that “consumer expectations do not constitute an independent
standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs”).
85
See Transcript, supra note 61, at 60–61.
86
David C. Vladeck, Artificial Intelligence & the Law: Essay: Machines
Without Principals: Liability Rules & Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV.
117, 123, 126 (2014).
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while the risk-utility test requires a showing of “a reasonable alternative
design,” one of the major challenges for consumers in prevailing over the
risk utility test might be that the technology of the vehicle in dispute might
be the safest available. 87 The lack of a safer alternative design in the
market would make the task of finding a reasonable alternative design
almost impossible.88
As to warning defect liability, manufacturers of automated
vehicles should be very cautious, trying to temper consumer expectations
through their warnings. While manufacturers competing against each
other will highlight the overall safety of their vehicles, they should also try
to caution consumers against unreasonable expectations regarding their
vehicles’ automated driving technology.89 Manufacturers might also need
to provide real-time warnings through consumers’ vehicles once the
vehicle detects that the driver is inattentive or is driving on harsh road
conditions.90
E. Is There a Solution?
Scholars have proposed a number of ideas to properly assign
liability regarding accidents related to software defects in automated
vehicles that are not clearly traceable to software designers or
manufacturers. Despite the challenges reviewed above, liability for
software defects caused by design or manufacturing error can be assessed
in a similar manner as other product defects based on settled product
liability theories. Therefore, finding solutions for rare software defects that
are at odds with the software designer’s direction and cannot be traced to
a human error will be most difficult.91
Conferring personhood on the vehicle has been one of the possible
suggested solutions.92 By treating each automated vehicle as a separate
business entity, victims of vehicle defects can bring claims against the
vehicle without deterring manufacturers from producing more automated
87

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
Gurney, supra note 65, at 265.
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See K.C. Webb, Products Liability & Autonomous Vehicles: Who’s Driving
Whom?, 23 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 40 (2016). (noting that manufacturers would
seek to manage consumer expectations, and provide adequate warnings for safe
use of AVs, while simultaneously encouraging use and advertising the overall
increased safety of the product).
90
Gurney, supra note 65, at 269–70.
91
See Vladeck, supra note 86, at 126 (discussing that assigning liability for
errors caused by human would not be difficult and that automated vehicles
should be held at the same or even higher standard errors traceable to
manufacturers).
92
Id. at 129.
88
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vehicles. In fact, NHTSA has recently indicated to Google that the
artificial intelligence system in the autonomous vehicle could be
interpreted as the driver.93 To do so, devising an insurance program for
each automated vehicle that would enable the vehicle to be treated as the
“driver” and compensate the victim would be necessary.94 For example,
insurance costs might have to be factored into the purchase price of an
automated vehicle.95
Also, manufacturers should be discouraged from setting
unreasonable expectations for consumers during advertising and sales that
their automated vehicles will be error free. 96 While customers buying
vehicles today would not expect current automated vehicle technology to
be completely reliable, the high expectations of modern day consumers of
electronics would likely transfer to automated vehicle industry. 97
Although manufacturers do not have to warn of obvious risks involved in
driving, they should not set unreasonable expectations for the safety of
automated vehicles and should be warned of potential risks. 98 If the
software in automated vehicles require updates, manufacturers should
alert end-users in a timely manner. 99 Also, to prevent security breach,
manufacturers should communicate critical security information to the
end-users of automated vehicles in a timely manner.100
Manufacturers should also specify the allocation of liability with
software vendors for potential software defects in automated vehicles.101
If manufacturers and software vendors are separate entities, the contractual
93
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limitations of liability for software vendors agreed between the
manufacturer and software vendor might preclude consumers from
bringing a claim against the software vendor. 102 At the same time,
manufacturers might be able to limit their liability for on-board software
defects. 103 This could leave the consumers with no one to hold
accountable. One possible solution for allocating risk among all parties
involved in making automated vehicles is to allocate risks born by
manufacturers through a “workers-compensation-style” liability regime
that shifts risks to insurance companies.104 Also, to minimize the concerns
about having to rely on experts in any product liability claim involving an
automated vehicle, courts should continue to accept the malfunction
doctrine to allow circumstantial evidence.

CONCLUSION
While widespread use of automated vehicles will significantly
improve road safety, reduce traffic congestion, and improve mobility
options for people with disabilities, it is unclear whether the current
product liability theories can adequately assess and allocate liability for
vehicle accidents caused by software defects. To encourage widespread
development of automated vehicle technology, legislators must find a
balance between deterring release of self-driving technology with
inadequate testing and lowering the burden for manufacturers. A rule
protecting consumers of automated vehicles by reducing the financial
burden of pursuing a product liability claim could be one solution. Also,
manufacturers could implement strategies to minimize product liability
exposure and solve disputes in a timely manner in the event of malfunction
to cultivate consumer interest in this new technology.
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